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God in the Deductions:
Tax Deductions for Religion and the
Future of Taxpayer Standing for
Establishment Clause Challenges
by DREW G. STARK*

Introduction
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause' has proven to be ripe
for debate over the proper role of religion in government.2 Over the last
few decades, the courts have addressed this issue seemingly countless
times, while failing to provide a single truly determinative test to assess
when government action violates the Establishment Clause . The Supreme
Court has proposed so many different tests to weigh Establishment Clause
challenges that this entire area of law has become muddled and unclear.4
Between the Lemon test, the endorsement test, the coercion test, and the
history-reliant approach of ceremonial deism, no one can ever be certain
which standard a court will apply in any particular Establishment Clause
case. 5
One particularly contentious ground in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is the difference between government subsidies granted

* Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, University of California, College of the Law.
1. The Establishment Clause states that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
2.

Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's FourEstablishment Clauses, 8 U. PA.

J. CONST. L. 725, 726-28 (2006).
3. Id. at 729.
4.

Id.

5. See, generally, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (for the Lemon test); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (for the endorsement test); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(for the coercion test); Van Order v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (for ceremonial deism). For a
more explicit explanation of what ceremonial deism entails see Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the
Constitutionalityof CeremonialDeism, 96 COLUM L. REv. 2083 (1996).
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directly to religious groups and tax deductions 6 granted to those same
institutions. Should the courts treat tax deductions any differently than
they treat direct expenditures? In some cases the Supreme Court has
refused to make a distinction between the two, yet in others, the Court has
found the difference between deductions and expenditures decisive.8 But,
why should the government be allowed to give indirect aid to religion when
direct aid would violate the Establishment Clause?
Tax expenditure analysis asks this very question and proposes that the
Supreme Court not treat tax deductions any differently than direct
expenditures. The basic premise of tax expenditure theory is that there is
no economic difference between the government's direct subsidy of an
activity or institution and an equivalent tax break for the same activity. 9
Because these actions are economically equivalent, the courts must legally
treat them the same.' 0 Thus, if a subsidy were unconstitutional, an
equivalent tax deduction would also be unconstitutional.
However, the Establishment Clause adds another layer to tax
expenditure analysis that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed.
Traditionally, standing prevents taxpayers from pursuing a claim in federal
court against the state when alleging that a particular state action is
unconstitutional without first showing an individual and personalized
injury." Unique to the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a narrow
exception that allows taxpayers to establish standing without showing the
personal injury required by the Court's modern Standing Doctrine. 12 These
taxpayer-plaintiffs have only to allege that the challenged state action
violates the Establishment Clause and arises from Congress' exercise of its
taxing and spending powers.13

6. When this note refers to tax deductions, it refers to tax deductions, tax exemptions, and
tax credits altogether.
7. Donna D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and the Courts: The Use
of Tax ExpenditureAnalysis in JudicialDecision Making, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 877-78

(1993).
8. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that there was no
difference between a direct expenditure and a sales tax exemption for religious periodicals);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (holding that tax deductions granted to parents who sent
their children to religious schools did not violate the Establishment Clause because the
entanglement between the state and religion was much less than what a direct expenditure would
require).
9. Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and ConstitutionalDecisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J.

407, 410 (1999).
10. Id.
11.

Lujan, Jr. v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).

12. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
13.

Id.
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While the Supreme Court has revisited this exception for taxpayer
standing several times since its creation, it has yet to address whether it
applies to challenges against tax deductions. All the cases reaching the
Court on this issue have involved direct expenditures. 14 In cases that
involve tax credits, exemptions, or deductions, the Court has either found
standing or neglected to raise the issue altogether.' 5
This Note addresses the question of whether the tax expenditure
analysis is appropriate for analyzing taxpayer standing in Establishment
Clause challenges. Thus far, the Supreme Court has wavered between
outright acceptance and rejection of the tax expenditure analysis. This
Note proposes that, at least for the issue of taxpayer standing, tax deduction
and direct expenditures should not be treated differently. If the Court
continues to engage in its usual tax deduction analysis, it will determine the
merits of a case when ruling on whether standing is satisfied, which is
something that standing ought to avoid.
Part I focuses on the current state of the Supreme Court's taxpayer
Standing Doctrine within the context of Establishment Clause cases. This
section starts by outlining the modem standing requirements before
examining the bar against taxpayer standing and the subsequent exception
for Establishment Clause challenges. The analysis highlights how the
Court has lacked the enthusiasm to extend taxpayer standing beyond a very
narrow exception.
Part II examines tax expenditure analysis and how it applies in
Establishment Clause cases. Specifically, this section surveys the cases
where the difference between tax deductions and tax expenditures was
decisive in the holding. It will identify the factors that influence how the
Court decides this question and suggests a potential solution for how the
Court can examine this issue by focusing on the intent behind the tax
deduction. Analysis of this solution brings to light the potential problems

14. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (denying taxpayer
standing for Establishment Clause challenges to the spending of Executive Branch discretionary
funds); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (allowing taxpayer standing for an
Establishment Clause challenge to Executive Branch spending on money appropriated by
Congress); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (denying taxpayer standing for an Establishment Clause challenge to
Congress exercising power under the Property Clause).
15. See, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) (challenging state tax credits for payments
to non-profit school tuition organizations); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989)
(allowing non-religious periodicals necessary standing to challenge tax exemption for religious
periodicals); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (challenging Minnesota tax deductions for
expense incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation to private schools); Comm.
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (challenge to New York tax
credits and deductions for attending non-public school).
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with such an intent-based approach of assessing the taxpayer standing
exception, before ultimately advocating that the Supreme Court adopt a
bright-line rule equating tax deductions and direct expenditures.
Standing's own internal logic requires that the Court adopt a consistent
approach to looking at tax deductions in the taxpayer standing analysis.

I.

Taxpayers and Taxpayer Standing

The Supreme Court's Standing Doctrine translates the requirements of
Article III's Cases and Controversies Clause' 6 into three simple elements.17
A plaintiff bringing suit in federal court must demonstrate: 1) that he or she
has experienced some concrete personal and individualized injury; 2) that
the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; and 3) that a
favorable decision from the court will likely redress the plaintiffs injury.' 8
Once all of these elements are met, a court can proceed to evaluate the
plaintiffs claim on its merits. 19 However, if any one of these elements is
not shown, a court cannot constitutionally consider the plaintiffs claim. 2 0
Through standing, courts seek to answer only those questions that are
appropriately justiciable, while leaving to the other branches of government
those issues that lack a remediable injury.21
A.

The (Almost) Absolute Bar Against Taxpayer Standing

Concern over confining courts to appropriately justiciable questions is
of particular importance when dealing with the issue of taxpayer standing.
Emerging from one of the first standing cases, the Supreme Court placed a
barrier on taxpayer standing to limit the extent that courts can review
actions of the executive and legislative branches.22 In Frothingham v.
Mellon, the Supreme Court articulated the beginning of what would
16. The full clause reads, "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and
Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two or more States; - between a State
and Citizens of another State; - between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
17. Lujan, Jr. v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[T]he core component of
standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 561.
Id
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-88 (1923).
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eventually become a central element of the Standing Doctrine. 2 3 The Court
first required that plaintiffs asserting a claim in federal court demonstrate a
personal and individualized injury before receiving a judgment on the
merits of their controversy.2 4
Frothinghambegan as a challenge alleging that the federal Maternity
Act was unconstitutional.25 Passed by Congress, this act allocated funds to
states with the goal of reducing maternal and infant mortality rates while
generally protecting the health of mothers and their infants.26 The plaintiff,
Frothingham, asserted that these expenditures exceed Congress' authority
because they usurp the power reserved to states under the Tenth
Amendment.27 She claimed that Congress' unconstitutional action injured
her by increasing her tax burden.28
Without reaching the merits of Frothingham's claim, the Supreme
Court held that she had no standing.29 According to the Court, a taxpayer's
interest in how the monies of the treasury are spent is so small, uncertain,
and indeterminable that it could not afford a basis for a court's
jurisdiction.3 o Because this interest was shared with millions of other
people, Frothingham could only show that she suffered in some indefinite
way that was common to taxpayers generally. 3 1 Thus, federal taxpayers do
not suffer an injury capable of raising a judicable question that could
satisfy the Cases and Controversy Clause. 32 This prohibition remains a
stable and essential part of the Court's Standing Doctrine.33
The Exception to Taxpayer Standing
For over forty years, the Supreme Court's holding in Frothingham
remained its final word on the issue of taxpayer standing.34 Then in 1968,
the Supreme Court departed from this hard-line barrier against taxpayer
B.

23. Id. at 488.

24. Id.
25. Id at 479.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id
Id
Id at 486-88.
Id

30. Id at 487.
31. Id. at 488.

32. Id
33. See generally Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a
(Misunderstood)StandingDoctrine,52 EMORY L. J. 771 (2003).

34. Doremus v. Bd. ofEduc. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (affirming Frothingham's
decision to deny standing to taxpayers alleging that state mandated Bible readings in school
violated the Establishment Clause).
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standing and crafted an exception from which it has since backed away.
In Flast v. Cohen, the Supreme Court created a limited window allowing
taxpayer Establishment Clause challenges to state actions.36
Flast involved a federal taxpayer's challenge to the Federal Education
Act of 1965.37 This act gave discretion to the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to allocate federal funds to local education
agencies to aid the education of low-income families. The plaintiff, Flast,
alleged that the Department was allocating funds to sectarian schools and
that violated the Establishment Clause.39 In pursuing this challenge, Flast
established standing solely via his status as a federal taxpayer.40
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court reexamined
Frothingham's bar against taxpayer standing. 41 Looking at the specific
allegation implicating the Establishment Clause, the Court determined that
federal taxpayers do have a sufficient interest in ensuring that Congress
does not use federal funds to establish a religion to satisfy Article III
standing.42 In order to determine whether a plaintiff had the "personal
stake" to invoke a court's authority absent a personal and individualized
injury, the Supreme Court promulgated a two-prong test.4 3 First, the
taxpayer must challenge a congressional act authorized under Article I,
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution,44 which defines Congress' taxing and
spending powers.45 Second, the taxpayer must allege that Congress
violated some constitutional limit placed on its taxing and spending
powers. 4 6 Once both of these requirements were met, plaintiffs would have
demonstrated a sufficient personal interest to satisfy standing.47
According to the Supreme Court, Flast satisfied both of these prongs.4 8
Congress had passed the Federal Education Act of 1965 pursuant to its
taxing and spending powers, thereby meeting the first prong of the Court's
35. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 602-08 (2007).
36. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
37. Id at 85.
38. Id. at 86.
39. Id
40. Id at 85.
41. Id at 95.
42. Id at 105-06.
43. Id at 102-03.
44. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (giving Congress the power to tax and spend for the general
welfare).
45. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
46. Id at 102-03.
47. Id at 103.
48. Id. at 102-03.
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49

new test.
Next, the Court determined that the Establishment Clause
demonstrates a clear intent to prohibit legislators from using the People's
money to establish religion.50 Because the plaintiff had alleged that state
action violated the Establishment Clause's limits on congressional
authority, he satisfied the test's second prong.51 Thus, for the first time
since Frothingham, the Court allowed a case to go forward without
requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate a personal and individualized
injury.
C. The Boundaries of Flast's Taxpayer Standing Exception
At the time of Flast, the Supreme Court was only willing to go so far
as to declare that the Establishment Clause satisfied the second prong of its
taxpayer standing test. It left to future cases the question of what specific
constitutional limitations would trigger Flast taxpayer standing.52
Potentially, this open-ended question could allow for future exceptions far
beyond the Establishment Clause's reach. However, the Court quickly
pulled back from this when it saddled Flast with a rigid formal application,
rife with arbitrary distinctions.
The Supreme Court closed off any avenue for broad taxpayer standing
when it declined to extend Flast's application beyond the Establishment
Clause's limits. The Court held that congressional actions potentially
violating the Accounting Clause 5 3 and the Incompatibility Clause 5 4 were
immune to challenges mounted on Flast taxpayer standing.55 Continuing
with this strict interpretation, the Court also limited which types of
congressional actions satisfied Flast's first prong.56 In Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separationof Church and State,
49.

Id. at 103.

50. Id. at 103-04.
51. Id. at 104.
52. Id.
53. This clause tasks Congress with the obligation to provide, "a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money [that] shall be published from time
to time." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
54. This clause reads, "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall
have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
55. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (denying
Flast taxpayer standing to plaintiffs seeking to enforce the Incompatibility Clause); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1972) (denying taxpayer standing to plaintiffs alleging that
Congress failed to comply with the Accounting Clause).
56. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 480 (1982).
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the Court declined to extend Flast to congressional actions authorized
under the Property Clause,s? while suggesting that the same action
performed under Congress' taxing and spending powers would have been
susceptible to a taxpayer standing challenge.
Together these decisions
demonstrate that the Court applies Flast with strict rigor and formalism. 59
Only those cases that closely follow the facts from Flast would satisfy the

exception.60
The Supreme Court's most recent decision on Flast standing followed
this formalist approach to its extreme by introducing an almost
imperceptible and arbitrary distinction into the analysis. 61 The Court had
previously held in Bowen v. Kendrick that executive discretionary spending
of funds appropriated by Congress was within the reach of a Flasttaxpayer
standing challenge. 62 However, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc., the Supreme Court held that executive discretionary
spending using funds appropriated generally from Congress, that is, funds
that were not appropriated for any specific purpose, was outside the reach
of Establishment Clause challenges mounted on the Flast exception.6 3 A
plurality of the Court distinguished Hein from Bowen by emphasizing that
the executive expenditure at issue in Bowen centered on a particular
program created by Congress for the executive to administer.6 Thus,
taxpayers can challenge executive discretionary spending when it stems
from the administration of a specific program, but they cannot challenge
executive discretionary spending from the Executive's discretionary
budget, even though Congress appropriates that budget.
A six-member majority of the Court found this distinction to be
completely arbitrary and irrational.65
Justice Scalia, writing in a
concurrence for himself and Justice Thomas, advocated overturning Flast
outright, but noted that the plurality's distinction is wholly irreconcilable

57. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3, cl. 2 ("Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States . . . .").
58.

Valley Forge ChristianColl., 454 U.S. at 480 n.17.

59.

For a more detailed criticism of Valley Forge'sformalist approach see Gene R. Nichol,

Jr., Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C. L. REv. 798

(1983).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 619.
Hein, 551 U.S. at 608-09 (plurality opinion).
Id.

65. Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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with simple logic.66 According to Justice Scalia, by focusing on the
amount of discretion the executive branch is allowed, the plurality opinion
completely broke from Bowen's established precedent to create a
meaningless and disingenuous distinction. Justice Souter's dissent shares
this sentiment. 68 He argues that Bowen controls the outcome and that by
allowing this distinction the executive can violate the Establishment Clause
without consequence when Congress' similar actions would violate that
clause's prohibition.
Rigid formalism and arbitrary distinctions govern the current Flast
jurisprudence. From Flastto Hein, the cases reveal that the Court disfavors
giving taxpayers the ability to circumvent the traditionally firm personal
injury requirement of Article III's standing. This relationship hangs like a
dark cloud over any question of whether the Court would be willing to
extend Flast further than its jurisprudence currently allows.

II. Congressional Expenditures and Tax Deductions:
Is There a Difference?
Cases like Hein demonstrate that in its taxpayer standing
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has often consciously refused to follow
the Flast holding to the extent of its logic. Thus, when asking whether the
Court would apply Flast equally to tax deductions, it is unclear what
approach the Court will favor. The Court's Establishment Clause cases
dealing with the difference between tax deductions and direct expenditures
are important in understanding how the Court will treat this issue in the
similar context of Flasttaxpayer standing.

A. Tax Expenditure Theory Explained
The central concept of tax expenditure analysis prompts courts to treat
direct expenditure, subsidy, tax deduction, and tax exemption programs all
the same.70 If a taxpayer receives a tax deduction, then tax expenditure
theory would require that the courts treat that deduction exactly as if the
71
Congress had granted the same amount of money directly to the taxpayer.
This analysis acknowledges that subsidies and deductions carry similar
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 640.

70. Adler, supra note 7, at 860-61.
71. David A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice, and Civil Rights: Expanding the
Scope of Civil Rights Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 BYU L. REV. 167, 209
(2001).
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economic effects.
When the government chooses to forgo taxing, it
removes certain resources from its grasp that it would otherwise be entitled
to collect. The taxpayer effectively becomes richer as a result of the
government's decision to forgo collecting those resources.
Tax expenditure theory recognizes that the tax code serves more
functions than simply defining income and raising revenue.73 Congress can
and does encourage certain behavior through provisions of the tax code.74
For example, Congress encourages donations to charities by granting
taxpayers a deduction for their charitable contributions.75 The theory
behind this deduction is that taxpayers will take advantage of it to reduce
their tax liability, thus aiding a charitable organization that would not have
received that aid if the tax deduction did not incentivize the taxpayer to act.
Congress has wide latitude to structure its social and economic policies
according to how it wants to encourage or discourage certain behavior. 76
The theory suggests that the tax code is comprised of two distinct
types of provisions.
Certain provisions define income for the sole
purpose of raising revenue.
These provisions are known as "structural
provisions" and would not be treated as if they were direct expenditures.7 9
Such provisions are not substitutes for subsidies because they are not
designed to encourage any particular behavior.80 Other provisions carry
out Congress' policy goals, and those "tax expenditure" provisions lie at
heart of the tax expenditure analysis. 1
Scholars propose that tax expenditure analysis requires that courts
treat tax deductions as if they were direct expenditures. 82 Tax expenditure
provisions serve a social policy goal beyond simply defining income.
Through these provisions, Congress exercises its broad powers to
encourage a certain activity, which it could accomplish just as easily
through its power to grant subsidies. 3 When Congress grants a tax
deduction in place of a subsidy, tax expenditure theory posits that the same

72. Adler, supra note 7, at 861.
73. Id. at 859.
74. Id.

75. I.R.C. § 170 (2010).
76. Adler, supra note 7, at 860.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Sugin, supra note 9, at 419.
81.

Id.

82. Adler, supra note 7, at 861.
83.

Id.
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84

rules and limits on Congress' power should apply. If Congress could not
act without violating the Constitution when subsidizing an activity, then it
should not be able to do the same thing through a tax deduction.
Thus,
tax expenditure analysis seeks consistency in how the law is applied.
B. Tax Deductions in Establishment Clause Cases
The Supreme Court has adopted a variety of approaches when
analyzing whether to treat a particular tax deduction as if it were a direct
Of particular interest to the question of whether tax
expenditure.
expenditure analysis should extend to Flast is how the Supreme Court
treats tax deductions within the Establishment Clause arena. Because Flast
is so integrally tied to the Establishment Clause, these cases ought to give
insight into whether the Court would be receptive to applying Flast
taxpayer standing to challenges of tax deductions. Unfortunately, these
cases reveal that the Court has failed to adopt a clear rule on this question.
Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York
In the context of the Establishment Clause, Walz v. Tax Commission of
the City of New York 86 was the first case to closely examine whether tax
Walz was an
deductions were equivalent to direct expenditures.8 7
Establishment Clause challenge to the New York tax code, which sought to
prevent the New York City Tax Commission from granting property tax
exemptions to religious organizations that owned property and used that
property for exclusively religious purposes. 8 The Walz plaintiffs argued
that the tax exemption indirectly required them to "make a contribution to
religious bodies." 8 9 In essence, the plaintiffs argued that the tax exemption
amounted to the state directly subsidizing religion with collected tax
monies.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention and upheld the New York
tax exemption. 90 The Court found that a subsidy was different from the tax
exemption that was at issue in Walz. 9 ' While acknowledging that religion
did receive some financial benefit, it explained that the tax exemption was
1.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id
Id.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Brennen, supranote 71, at 213.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 666.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 675.
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not equivalent to a direct subsidy.92 Tax exemptions were actually less
likely to violate the Establishment Clause because no revenue flowed
directly from the state to any religious group, which meant the exemption
did not require the state to administer or enforce how the money was
spent.93 The Court conceded, however, that a subsidy granting the same
After
benefit to religion would violate the Establishment Clause.
explicitly rejecting that the two things were equivalent, the Court found
that the exemption did not advance religion because it was not available to
any particular religion and, more importantly, it was available to many nonsectarian organizations as well. 95 Thus, in Walz, the form of the benefit, an
exemption, significantly influenced the Court's decision.
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist
The Supreme Court nearly reversed itself from its position in Walz
when it came to consider the question again in Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.9 6 The plaintiffs in Nyquist
alleged that certain New York statutes providing financial aid programs for
private grade schools violated the Establishment Clause. 97 These programs
included grants to private schools, tuition reimbursement for low-income
parents sending their children to those schools, and tax deductions for
parents paying private school tuition.9 8 The plaintiffs alleged that these
programs violated the Establishment Clause because a substantial majority
of the schools benefiting from them were religious. 99
The programs at issue in Nyquist included both direct subsidies and
tax deductions, yet the Supreme Court treated them exactly the same.ioo
The Court found that a financial benefit granted to a religious organization
violated the Establishment Clause regardless of how that benefit was
distributed. 01 Whether that benefit was administered through a direct
subsidy or a tax deduction did not matter to the Court's analysis because
these were targeted benefits available exclusively to religious private
2.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 673.
Id
Id. at 675.
Id.
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789 (1973).
Id at 762-63.
Id.
Id. at 768.
Id at 789-9 1.
Id.
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schools and parents sending their children to those schools.1 0 2 Therefore,
the Court held that all provisions violated the Establishment Clause
regardless of their form. 0 3
3.

Mueller v. Allen

In Mueller v. Allen, 104 the Supreme Court once again completely
changed its position on how to treat direct expenditures and tax
deductions.s0 5 Minnesota allowed taxpayers to claim deductions for tuition
and transportation expenses incurred while educating their children.106
Because the substantial majority of private schools that benefited from
these deductions were parochial schools, the Mueller plaintiffs filed suit
claiming that these deductions violated the Establishment Clause. 0 7 The
Supreme Court rejected this challenge and held that the deductions did not
violate the Establishment Clause because they did not have the primary
purpose of advancing religion. os
Turning to the issue of whether these tax deductions should be treated
the same as direct expenditures, the Supreme Court rejected its previous
holding from Nyquist and ruled that there was a clear difference between
the two types of financial assistance.109 While the Court did acknowledge
that tax deductions could violate the Establishment Clause, it found that
Minnesota's deductions did not."o The deductions were neutrally offered
to all taxpayers regardless of whether their children attended a public
school or a religious private school."' Any financial benefit that the
parochial schools received arose from the private choice of the parents and
not the state, which the Court found key in its analysis.1 2 The Court relied
on this difference to hold that the deductions were constitutional.1'

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id
Id.at 793-94.
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
Id at 398.
Id at391.
Id at 392.
Id.
Id at 398.
Id at400.
Id
Id at 401-02.
Id
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Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock

Again in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Supreme Court flipflopped on how it treated tax deductions.l 14 Texas exempted periodicals
published or distributed by religious groups from the state's sales tax." 5
Non-religious publishers and distributors did not receive a comparable
exemption.' 16 One of the non-religious publishers brought suit, claiming
that this special exemption for religious periodicals violated the
Establishment Clause.' 17
The Supreme Court agreed and held that the tax exemptions were
unconstitutional."' When examining the tax exemption, the Court found
that every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy, which forces taxpayers into
becoming "indirect and vicarious donors."" 9 By exclusively granting this
tax exemption, Texas was in effect directly subsidizing religious
organizations, which burdened non-religious periodicals still subject to the
state's sales tax. 120 The Court explained that such a direct subsidy would
surely violate the Establishment Clause, and that this tax exemption
violated the clause as well. 12 1 However, the Court added that this tax
exemption might not have violated the Establishment Clause if it had been
offered to a larger neutrally defined group, much like the widely defined
property tax exemption in Walz, which both secular and religious
organizations could claim. 12 2
5.

Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia

In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,
the Supreme Court once again dealt with indirect aid to religion and
whether that indirect aid should be treated as if it was a direct subsidy.12 3
The University of Virginia allowed student organizations to apply for and
have the university fund their student publications.124 A religious student
group sought funding from the university to pay for its religious

114. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (plurality opinion).

115. Id. at 5.
116. Id
117. Id at 6.

118. Id at 14.
119. Id. (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983)).
120. Id. at 15.
121.
122.

Id
Id at 16.

123.

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823 (1995).

124. Id
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publication, which the school refused to do by claiming that such an act
would violate the Establishment Clause. 125
The Supreme Court disagreed with the university's position, holding
that these payments for printing costs did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 126 The university's program was facially neutral because it offered
to pay the printing costs for any qualified student organization that
applied.12 7 Because the Rosenberger plaintiffs fit into this neutral
definition, the university would not impermissibly support religion by
128
paying for the printing of the group's religious publication.
The Court's analysis turned on whether there was direct aid to
religion, thus the Court neglected to look at whether the indirect aid given
to religion through these payments amounted to an Establishment Clause
violation.129 Rather, the Court found that the university was not taxing its
students and then giving that money directly to a religious group.130 Key to
the Court's analysis was that the university did not pay any money directly
to the religious organization.131 The money instead went directly to the
printer.13 2 This analysis implies a firm rejection of tax expenditure theory.
The Court here seems to suggest that taxes can only violate the
Establishment Clause when the proceeds of those taxes flow directly in
support of religion.133
Interestingly, while the Court avoided discussing the difference
between direct payments and indirect support through tax deductions,
Justice Thomas explicitly acknowledged and accepted tax expenditure
theory in his concurrence.134 Justice Thomas explained that functionally
and economically there is little difference between indirect aid, like tax
deductions, and direct monetary subsidies.135 But he then turned the
traditional tax expenditure analysis around, and claimed that it justifies
direct financial support of religion.136 Because the Court had previously

125. Id at 826-27.
126. Id. at 840.

127. Id.
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. Id at 859 n.5 (Thomas, J., concurring).
135.

Id at 860-61.

136. Id.
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allowed indirect support of religion in Walz and Mueller, Justice Thomas
argued that direct support was also constitutional. 137
6.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris

Though Rosenberger appeared to have left a hard rule regarding when
indirect financial aid to religion would violate the Establishment Clause,
the Supreme Court returned to this issue in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.3 1
Ohio instituted a school voucher program that allowed parents to receive
tuition aid to send their children to schools participating in the program.1 3 9
These schools could be either public or private.140 Because many of the
participating private schools were religious, a group of Ohio taxpayers sued
alleging that the program violated the Establishment Clause.141
Citing to its decisions in Walz and Mueller, the Supreme Court upheld
Ohio's voucher program because it turned entirely on private choice. 14 2
The Court explained that in a program of true private choice with neutrally
defined religious categories to choose from, the state was relieved of any
Establishment Clause problem because the state was not the one choosing
to aid religion.143 The parents receiving the aid made the choice of how to
use their vouchers, which alleviated the state's responsibility. 144 Thus, the
Court found that the voucher program was constitutional because this
indirect aid was clearly different than direct aid. 145
C. The Establishment Clause, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Taxpayer
Standing
Together these cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has failed to
adopt a bright-line rule regarding how it will treat tax deductions. When
turning to how the Court will treat tax deductions under the Flast taxpayerstanding analysis, these cases fall short of clearly signifying how the Court
will act in this similar context. However, these cases do indicate what the
Court will consider in determining whether it is appropriate to treat a tax
deduction as a direct expenditure. Because the Flast taxpayer spending
analysis is so rigidly tied into the Establishment Clause, the Court's

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661 (2002).
Id. at 645.
Id.
Id.
Id at 661.
Id
Id.
Id.
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treatment of tax expenditures within the Establishment Clause context is
important in determining whether Flast will apply to tax deductions as
well.
The Supreme Court has identified a number of factors that it will
consider when deciding whether to treat indirect financial support of
religion as a direct subsidy from the state. The Court appears to be most
concerned with taxpayer choice, the scope of the deduction, and if any nonreligious groups receive the same tax benefit. By considering these factors,
the Court engages in a fact specific, case-by-case analysis when it decides
how to approach a tax deduction. This analysis suggests that even though
the Court is aware of tax expenditure theory, it has been wary to adopt or
reject it outright. 14 6
In cases like Nyquist and Texas Monthly, the Supreme Court found
that there was no difference between direct expenditures and tax
deductions. The Court acknowledged in both cases that the tax exemptions
were directly targeted to aid religion at the expense of non-religious
groups, which were entirely excluded from the exemptions' benefits. 147
The narrow and focused nature of these deductions led the Supreme Court
to follow traditional tax expenditure theory in its decision to equate tax
deductions with subsidies. 14 8 These decisions stand in contrast to cases
where the Supreme Court has found that there is a difference between the
two. In those cases, the tax deductions were broad blanket provisions that
were neutrally provided to both non-religious and religious organizations

alike.149
Additionally, in cases where the Court found that there was a clear
difference between indirect financial aid to religion and direct
expenditures, there was usually some choice by a third-party private citizen
that relieved the government of its responsibility. In Mueller, Rosenberger
and Zelman, the Court found that intervening private choice influenced its
decision to treat indirect financial aid differently than it would have treated
the same provisions if they had provided for direct expenditures.150 Thus,
while a direct expenditure would violate the Establishment Clause, the
Court has determined that an indirect tax benefit would not if it was the
146. Justice Thomas' concurrence and the dissent in Rosenberger show that the Court is
aware of tax expenditure theory. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 5 15 U.S.
819 (1995).
147. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989); Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789-91 (1973).
148. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 789.
149. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664,675 (1970).
150. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661 (2002); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840;
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401-02 (1983).
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result of a taxpayer's private choice. These cases demonstrate that the
Court's decision on how to treat a tax deduction largely depends on how
the tax deduction is structured and administered.
The Court's analysis seems to be an attempt to determine the intent
behind the particular tax deduction that is at issue. Those tax deductions
that appear intended to serve as simple substitutes for direct expenditures
are treated as if they were direct expenditures. For example, the sales tax
exemption in Texas Monthly was exclusively granted to religious
periodicals, which the Court understood to show intent to give religious
periodicals a benefit not available to other periodicals. 5' On the other
hand, the Court treats tax deductions that are part of larger schemes not
specifically directed towards religion as different from direct subsidies.
The Court found that Mueller involved a tax scheme aimed at helping
parents by reducing the cost of sending their children to school. 152
According to the Court, this aid was incidental to the overall program,
which made the deductions available to both public and private schools.153
The broad neutral application of the statute seems to suggest that the intent
behind the statute was not to aid parochial schools specifically, but rather to
aid all parents regardless of the schools their children attended. Therefore,
it seems that whether the Supreme Court follows tax expenditure analysis
largely depends on the evidence surrounding the tax deduction at issue and
seems to turn on the intent underlying those deductions.
Professor Sugin suggests that the Court should explicitly adopt this
intent based approach when evaluating tax deductions. 154 She argues that
discerning government intent is crucial in any Establishment Clause
analysis of a statute, and it should also be crucial in how courts treat tax
deductions.15 5 Under her analysis, the more targeted tax provisions would
be vulnerable to tax expenditure analysis because government intent would
be easier to infer from the evidence.156 The more general a provision is, the
less vulnerable it would be because its generality would not demonstrate a
specific intent to advance religion. 5 1
For example, if the tax. code were amended so that only charitable
contributions to Christian organizations qualified for a tax deduction,5 8

151.

Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400.
Id.
Sugin, supra note 9, at 437.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 437.
Id.
Contributions to charitable organizations are tax deductable. I.R.C. § 170 (2010).
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then Professor Sugin's intent analysis would find that amended code
unconstitutional for violating the Establishment Clause. This type of
statute would be susceptible to tax expenditure analysis because its targeted
nature reveals intent to aid Christian organizations. Thus, it would be
treated as if it were a direct expenditure aiding religion. However, the code
currently stands as a broad laundry list of qualifying charitable
organizations, which includes religious organizations. 159 Laundry list
provisions would not fall under the tax expenditure analysis because they
do not suggest intent to aid religion. Instead, those provisions demonstrate
that religion is only receiving a benefit incidental to a tax scheme designed
to achieve a much larger goal.
While this may be the appropriate solution when determining whether
a tax deduction violates the Establishment Clause outright, this solution is
unworkable for resolving the taxpayer standing question posed by the Flast
analysis. Unlike the question of whether some state action violates the
Establishment Clause, the standing inquiry is not a fact-specific inquiry.
Standing simply asks whether the plaintiff has alleged the proper elements
to invoke the court's power to adjudicate his or her claim. 16 0
Whereas the normal standing inquiry requires the plaintiff to allege a
specific individual and personal injury, Flast standing allows taxpayers to
proceed with suit alleging that a particular state action violates the
Establishment Clause without showing a personal injury. 16 1 To do this, the
taxpayer must connect the challenged state action to a congressional act
aiding religion. The problem is that indirect aid to religion is often difficult
to identify when it is administered through tax deductions rather than direct
expenditures. According to the Court, as long as the challenged state
action is tied to Congress' taxing and spending powers, it should be
susceptible to taxpayer standing.
However, the cases discussed above demonstrate that equating tax
deductions with expenditure is not so easy within the context of the
Establishment Clause. This is especially true because the Supreme Court
has imposed such arbitrary and rigid requirements on taxpayers trying to
assert Flast taxpayer standing. The Court has been unwilling to extend
Flast to even the natural limits of its own logic, which a majority of the
Court recognized in Hein.162 The difference between direct congressional

159. For a list of qualified charitable organizations to which a taxpayer may donate and claim
an income tax deduction, see I.R.C. § 501(c) (2010).
160. Lujan, Jr. v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
161. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
162. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
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expenditures and tax deductions may become another of the arbitrary
distinctions that are common to Flast'sjurisprudence.
For the Supreme Court to avoid further muddling this area of law with
inconsistent results, it must adopt a bright-line rule concerning Flast and
tax deductions. The Court should either allow Flast taxpayer standing to
challenge tax deductions, or prohibit it. To remain consistent with its other
Establishment Clause tax deduction cases, the Court must extend the first
prong of Flast's taxpayer standing analysis to cover challenges to tax
deductions. To do otherwise would suggest that tax deductions somehow
fall outside the reach of the Establishment Clause. By challenging a tax
deduction, a taxpayer-plaintiff will have satisfied the first prong of the
Flast test. As long as the second prong is also met, that taxpayer will have
met the exception for taxpayer standing.
The Supreme Court's own Establishment Clause tax deduction cases
indicate that tax deductions fall under judicial review as much as any direct
expenditure. In each case, the Court went through a detailed fact specific
analysis to determine whether the specific tax provision at issue would be
treated as a direct expenditure or as something else. But, before even that
analysis, each case started from the assumption that the Establishment
Clause applied. To achieve consistent results with its Flastjurisprudence
and tax deduction cases, the Court should adopt tax expenditure theory for
this narrow analysis.
Implicit in all of these cases is the idea that the Court considers
indirect aid to religion to be within the sphere of the Establishment
Clause's limits. In some cases indirect aid through tax deductions was
impermissible, while in others the same type of indirect aid was entirely
constitutional. However, none of these cases suggested that tax deductions
or other indirect aid fall outside of the Establishment Clause's purview
entirely. While the difference between the two was important to the
outcome of the cases discussed above, both subsidies and deductions
invoked the Court's full Establishment Clause analysis. A tax deduction
could violate the Establishment Clause just as easily as a direct expenditure
if that deduction was narrowly granted and specifically targeted towards
Therefore, at the preliminary standing stage, tax
aiding religion.
deductions should sufficiently invoke the taxpayer's interests in preventing
the state from aiding religion.
If the Supreme Court were to continue to equivocate between treating.
tax deductions as expenditures, then the inquiry into whether a tax
deduction satisfied Flast's first prong would become conclusive.
Typically, the Court examines the scope of deduction, whether the statute
neutrally defines the groups that benefit and whether there is an intervening
private choice when examining whether a tax deduction should be treated
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as a subsidy. This is a fact-intensive approach that would ultimately
determine the outcome of the case. Those tax deductions that the Court
found indistinguishable from expenditures would also be found to violate
the Establishment Clause. 16 3 When the Court determined that there was a
clear difference between the two, it found the tax deductions
Yet, the Court cannot follow this analysis when
constitutional. 16
examining standing because in doing so the Court would necessarily decide
the outcome of the case as well, which is a result that standing intends to
avoid. In cases were a court found taxpayer standing, the challenged
deductions would be unconstitutional. Thus, the Court must rule that tax
deductions satisfy Flast to avoid this problem.
In summary, the logic behind standing obligates the Supreme Court to
adopt a bright-line rule treating tax deductions in the Flast analysis as if
they were direct expenditures. To avoid having an inquiry into taxpayer
standing turn into a larger determination of the case's merits, the Court
must adopt a rule declaring that all congressional tax deductions satisfy
Flast's first prong. Because the Court has already acknowledged in several
Establishment Clause cases that tax deductions fall within the limits of that
clause's prohibition, it should treat tax deductions as direct expenditures in
the Flast analysis to avoid inconsistent results.

Conclusion
This Note demonstrates that tax deductions and taxpayer standing
remain two areas of the law that the Supreme Court has yet to clarify. The
future of Flast's exception to the bar against taxpayer standing looks hazy.
Several members of the Court seem committed to overturning Flast
outright, while others limit Flast's application through strict and arbitrary
line drawing. As it stands, certain kinds of congressional appropriations
are subject to Flast-based Establishment Clause challenges and other
congressional appropriations are not. How the Court will assess tax
deductions under this scheme remains to be seen.
The Court's cases addressing whether tax deductions are legally
equivalent to direct expenditures offer little guidance on this question.
Within the similar context of the Establishment Clause, the Court has
shifted between two extreme positions. According to the Court, certain tax
deductions are indistinguishable from direct subsidies while others are
completely different. Often this determination is the result of an intensive
163. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989); Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789-91 (1973).
164. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661 (2002); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401-02 (1983).
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fact-specific inquiry into the structure and intent behind the tax deduction.
However, such an inquiry does not readily lend itself to a standing analysis.
The Supreme Court needs to adopt a position equating all tax
deductions to tax expenditures for the Flast analysis. While the Court has
treated tax deductions differently depending on the facts, all of its cases
addressing deductions start from the position that deductions fall within the
Establishment Clause's limits. In a standing analysis, which looks at the
facts alleged by the plaintiff, the Court's consistent position that tax
deductions warrant Establishment Clause treatment indicates that it would
also treat tax deductions as expenditures for the preliminary question of
whether standing has been satisfied. Some of those tax deductions may be
indistinguishable from expenditures, but courts need to examine the facts to
make that determination. If courts continue to examine these factors before
deciding this question, they may have to retroactively find standing when
they rule that the tax deduction at issue is no different from a subsidy. For
the threshold question of standing, tax deductions should be considered
sufficiently tied to Congress' taxing and spending power to satisfy the first
Flast prong and allow the courts to consider the greater Establishment
Clause issues alleged.

